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IV

Brent Fisher ("Brent") hereby submits his reply brief in support of his cross
appeal. Pursuant to Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Brent limits his
reply to those issues raised by appellants Kim and Michael Fisher ("Kim" and "Michael"
respectively) in that portion of their cross-appellee brief, being their opposition to Brent's
cross appeal on the issues of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN
WHOLE OR IN PART.
A.

Limitation of Liability Clause.

Kim and Michael offer the Court a second interpretation of the limitation of
liability clause, without any authority or justification, for this Court to apply to the Trust
language. Because Brent's application results in logical consistency, this Court should
reject Kim and Michael's interpretation and apply the clause to preclude all prejudgment
interest damages.
The limitation clause states that "[a]ny liability whatsoever, of any trustee... shall
be limited and confined to the principal and income of the Trust Estate itself." Trust,
Exh. 18,p.l3.
Brent's interpretation, urged to this Court, is that his father intended for the trustee
to be liable to the beneficiaries for any principal and income damages he cannot account
for, but no more. Under the Trust, liability for any other type of losses, including
interest, penalties, consequential damages, punitive damages, and the like, are not
imposed upon the trustee. He is liable for any actual benefit retained. This interpretation
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is certainly understandable, as George and his wife served as the initial trustees and
incurred this same liability under the Trust to the other beneficiaries for more than sixteen
years, and he knew he would thrust this obligation on family members upon his death.
The trial court found that the principal of the Trust included 50 head of cattle, and
made Brent liable therefor. The trial court also found that the Trust included certain real
property, and made Brent liable for the rental income on that property that should have
been recovered. Precluding prejudgment interest damages is not a windfall to Brent that
violates any public policy. It is merely a statement of intent by George to limit the
liability of those family members designated as trustees to any benefits actually
wrongfully obtained.
Kim and Michael would have this Court believe that this clause sets a cap on
trustee damage exposure at $632,312 - the value of the Trust principal on the date of
George's death (presumably plus any income received thereafter). This is the illogical
interpretation, as it can lead to inconsistent results. For example, it is an arbitrary
limitation not tied to any actual conduct giving rise to the damages. Under this reading, if
a trustee were to abscond with all of the Trust property, he would be liable for only the
value of that property and no more, but if he only removed half of the property, he can be
liable for interest and consequential damages up to twice the benefit obtained.
The Trust does not use Kim and Michael's word "damages." It does not say
"damages" are limited and confined to principal and income. The limitation is on
liability, or "legal obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 914 (6th Ed. 1991). The Trust
limits Brent's obligation to principal and income. The Trust precludes Brent from being
2

obligated for anything more. This is simply the application of the canon of construction
latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (to express one thing is to exclude
another). Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.3d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); Mifflin v. Shiki, 11
Utah 190, 195 (Utah 1930). Therefore, interest was not property included as an element
recoverable against Brent, and should be removed from the judgment calculation.
Section 1008 of the Utah Trust Code does not apply, as it requires conduct "in bad
faith or with reckless indifference...." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1008. Kim and Michael
argue the assumption with no support whatsoever that Brent acted with reckless
indifference. There was no finding to support this conclusion. Kim and Michael would
require this Court to make a factual finding as to Brent's culpability on evidence not
presented for consideration by this Court. Moreover, to ascribe reckless indifference to
Brent's conduct would reverse the trial court's express factual finding that Brent's
conduct was in "good faith," and merely a "mistake[J." R.537, \ 10. That finding was
never presented for reversal by this Court.
B.

Inability to Fix the Date and Amount of Loss.

Prejudgment interest is also improper on a separate ground as applied to the cattle
damages. Kim and Michael offer no authorities to contradict Brent's articulation of the
law of prejudgment interest. They offer no challenge to Brent's argument regarding the
lack of definiteness as to the cattle damage value calculation. Absent any reason to
deviate from prejudgment interest law, because these damages "cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy... prejudgment interest is not allowed." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898
P.2dl379, 1387(1995).
3

Kim and Michael do challenge Brent's alternative basis for denying these damages
- that the loss cannot be "fixed as of a particular time." Id. They recognize the trial court
expressly found that there was no evidence of the date of cattle conversion. Appellant's
[sic] Reply Brief, p.l. They ascribe error to that finding, but short of overturning this
factual finding, the legal effect of this finding is an inability to fix the date of loss.
Kim and Michael identify three pieces of evidence they claim "establish[]" April
18, 1992 as the date of conversion. Id. These are not persuasive at all, let alone
sufficient to overturn the trial court's factual finding as clearly erroneous.
First, failure to account for cattle on February 23, 2004 (see Ex. 1) does not
"establish" that the date of conversion was April 18, 1992. It merely establishes a date of
conversion prior to February 23, 2004.
Second, Brent's testimony that the Trust owned no cattle at the time of his father's
death does not establish a date of conversion. Had this testimony been accepted by the
trial court, it would have absolved Brent of all liability on the cattle, as they never would
have come under his stewardship. However, it is not evidence of any date of conversion.
Finally, the May 8, 1995 Trustee's Allocation does not establish any date as the
date of conversion, much less April 18, 1992. Ex. 15. Rather, it purports to identify the
existence of cattle on that date, not the disappearance thereof.
All Kim and Michael's evidence establishes is that if there were any cattle in the
Trust during Brent's administration, they were unaccounted for sometime between April
18, 1992 and February 23, 2004. The trial court found it persuasive that by including the
cattle on the Trustee's Allocation when that was prepared on May 8, 1995, the cattle were
4

present at least as of that date, and the conversion occurred sometime thereafter. Kim
and Michael offer no evidence to the contrary.
All Kim and Michael rely on to override Utah Supreme Court holdings on the
availability and application of prejudgment interest are "equitable principles."
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 10. While Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148, does
afford a trial court "discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable remedies" {Id. at \ 24),
Kim and Michael misunderstand its application. It is a maxim of equity jurisprudence
that "equity follows the law." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1992); Martin
v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1153 (Utah 1936). "A Court of equity cannot, by
avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the law, create a remedy in
violation of law...." M v . Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 893 (1988). When the Utah
Supreme Court makes pronouncements on the conditions required to apply prejudgment
interest the trial court cannot ignore these principles in the name of equitable jurisdiction
or public policy. It was legal error for the trial court to award cattle prejudgment interest,
and this Court should reverse that ruling.
II.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS PRECLUDED IN WHOLE OR IN PART
IN THIS CASE.
Brent's statutory entitlement to attorneys' fees reimbursement stands. Section 75-

7-1004 of the Utah Uniform Trust Code applies, and no law to the contrary would require
the trial court to deny Brent his fees - which the trial court later ruled it had not intended
to do. R.899.
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Kim and Michael err in claiming the statute does not apply to Brent. First, the
Utah Uniform Trust Code as adopted in 2004
applies to... judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced
before July 1, 2004 unless the court finds that application of a
particular provision of this chapter would substantially interfere with
the effective conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the
rights of the parties...."
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1103(1 )(c) (emphasis added). The Court made no findings to bar
application of Section 75-7-1004 as adopted in 2004 to this proceeding.
Section 75-7-1103(3) does not change the analysis. It reads that "[a]n act done
before July 1, 2004 is not affected by this chapter." The compensable act Brent
undertook entitling him to recover fees was "defending]... any proceeding in good faith,
whether successful or not...." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2). This defense occurred
nearly entirely after July 1, 2004. Occurrence of the acts he was defending is not
apposite. He is not seeking to recover fees for that conduct, but rather the good-faith
defense of this proceeding.
Further, Kim and Michael take liberties with the applicable standard. They claim
this statute "requires" that the trustee act "for the benefit of the trust" to recover fees.
Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 12. This language is not found in the statute, and Kim and
Michael offer no authority for this supposed requirement. The standard is: did Brent
defend this proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not. According to the trial
court:
.. .given the Courts [sic] ruling, Brent Fisher prevailed on one issue
and was successful in reducing the claims to less than lA on the other
issues. He clearly prevailed on the claim that he converted funds,
6

his defense reduced the requested recovery on the cows by 2/3 and
the recovery on the requested rent by over !4. Where claims are
grossly overstated, it is reasonable that a defense be made.
R. 540, ^f 17. This finding supports a ruling that Brent is entitled by statute to recover his
attorneys' fees.
Kim and Michael hyperbolize when asserting that "Utah could stand alone" if it
rules in Brent's favor. They cite a single case from Illinois for the proposition that a
trustee should not defend these "grossly overstated" (R. 540, Tf 17) claims with trust
reimbursement. Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 11-12. Grate v. Grzetich, 867 N.E.2d 577
(111. App. 2007) is not applicable to this Court's analysis. Grate involved a challenge to a
partial fee award under a discretionary statute permitting reimbursement for expenses
incurred "in the management and protection of trust assets." Id. at 579. Citing Illinois
law, the appellate court ruled that the trustee "did not incur the attorney fees while
protecting the trust's assets." Id. at 580. Therefore, the reimbursement statute did not
reach to the trustee's defense.
In this case, the statute is clear - if the trustee defends any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive his necessary expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004(2). If the legislature intended
to limit recovery to cases where trust assets were being protected, the statute would not
be worded so broad. Indeed, as intended by the legislature, the trustee can recover even
if he does not prevail so long as the defense was made in good faith. Here, Brent
prevailed on one claim, dramatically reduced the other claims, and the Court expressly
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ruled that his defense was reasonable. It would be legal error to deny Brent his fee
recovery.1
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brent respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
trial court's conclusions regarding the application of prejudgment interest and the failure
to award attorneys' fees to Brent.
DATED this 1 7 ^ d a y of April, 2009.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

By_
Jenson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Thomas A. Mecham
Christopher S. Hill
Attorneys for Respondent, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant Brent Fisher

While Brent is not permitted to respond in this reply to matters Kim and Michael
addressed in their reply on opening appeal issues, Brent does call the Court's attention to
Kim and Michael's improper efforts to raise new issues on reply. On appeal, Kim and
Michael did not designate as issues for review (i) whether the trial court improperly
refused to address Brent's duties to account and produce documents, and (ii) challenging
the trial court finding of Brent's good faith. On reply, Kim and Michael raise these new
challenges for the first time (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 6-8), which is not permitted.
State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60,ffif20-21, 6 P.3d 1116. Rather than improperly argue these
new matters on cross-appeal reply, Brent raises the issue for the Court to address if and
how it deems appropriate.
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